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1.1 Contract formation in Scotland: offer, acceptance, counterpart execution and 
agreement  
In 1684 the Duke of Gordon engaged Robert Smith to serve him and his family ‘in chirurgery 
and physic, and also to supervise his buildings and architecture’ – an interesting combination 
of medical and property services.  Smith’s salary was to be 200 merks a year plus board 
when the Duke was at home and a daily subsistence allowance otherwise.  Smith and the 
Duke each signed a copy of their agreement, then exchanged these copies.  Some 
seventeen years later, in 1701, Smith obtained decree in Edinburgh Sheriff Court against the 
Duke for non-payment of 2,823 pounds Scots due under the contract, this representing ‘so 
many years board wages, during the years the Duke did not live at home, at the rate of 12 
pence per day’.1  The scale of Smith’s claim suggests that the Duke did not spend much time 
at home.  The Duke sought to appeal in the Court of Session in Edinburgh, on the basis that 
‘by the contract produced by the charger himself [i.e. Smith], it appears, the clause pursued 
on is a marginal note, and which, not being subscribed by the Duke, but only by Smith 
himself, can never oblige the Duke.’  The court held, however, ‘that mutual contracts having 
two doubles need not be subscribed by both parties-contracters, but it was sufficient in law if 
the Duke's principal was signed by Smith and his counterpart by the Duke.’  The court 
‘therefore sustained the marginal note, though not signed by the Duke, seeing it was 
contained in his own double uncancelled’.  The report of Smith v Duke of Gordon 
summarises the effect of the decision as being that ‘if a mutual contract is executed by two 
counterparts, it is sufficient if each party subscribes the paper containing what is prestable 
on himself’.2  The court thus took a fairly liberal approach to the effect of the Duke’s 
undoubted subscription of the double in Smith’s possession as embracing the unsubscribed 
marginal note thereon, with perhaps some sort of personal bar (estoppel) arising from the 
fact that he had not struck out the note in his own double even though that part of the 
document had indeed been subscribed by Smith.  It should however be observed that the 
court noticed that the clause in the marginal note ‘seemed materially to differ’ in the two 
copies, and remitted the case for further inquiry on this point before the ordinary judge 
(presumably the Sheriff in Edinburgh).  
 Smith v Duke of Gordon is a decision which seems to have passed virtually un-
noticed in cases and legal texts for the next 300 years, apart from a reference in Lord 
                                               
1
 A merk was worth 2/3 of a pound Scots, itself valued in 1707 at one-twelfth of a pound sterling. 
2
 Smith v Duke of Gordon (1701) Mor 16987.  Cubbison v Cubbison (1716) Mor 16988 also involved ‘doubles of a 
writ’, and in that case there were three such ‘doubles’.   
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Bankton’s Institute of the Laws of Scotland, published between 1751 and 1753,3 and one 
citation in 1957 in Wilson v Fenton Bros (Glasgow) Ltd.4   That case involved the exchange 
by parties of duplicates of a patent licence agreement, each party signing one copy and then 
handing that copy over to the other.  It was held that the licence agreement had been validly 
executed, and the judge said:   ‘In my view, the documents produced and to which I have 
referred, establish the fact of a completed agreement between the pursuers and the 
defenders.’  He went on to observe:  
The form of the agreement is not a usual one in Scotland, but, as all the negotiations 
were conducted in England, the method of having two copies, of which one copy is 
signed by each party and delivered to the other party, was adopted in conformity, as I 
am informed, with a common practice in England.5   
 This comment encapsulates why the Duke of Gordon case is so surprising at first sight: 
the mode of contract formation in late seventeenth-century Scotland apparent in that case is 
one that more recent Scots lawyers, certainly those of the twentieth century, have 
associated exclusively with English practice, especially conveyancing practice; so much so, 
in fact, that when English commercial lawyers took it up as a way of concluding written deals 
between remote parties, there were plenty of Scots lawyers who thought that such a thing 
was not legally possible in Scotland.6 
 One of the reasons why modern Scots lawyers got into these difficulties was because 
for two centuries they had been taught that the usual way in which a contract was created 
was by a bilateral process of an offer by one party met by an acceptance thereof by the 
offeree.  In this way they have perhaps fallen into the trap of excessive formalism in matters 
of contract formation as identified in Shawn Bayern’s contribution to this volume.7  The 
model remains a familiar one in standard transactions in which lawyers typically act for their 
clients: notably house purchases but also other transactions relating to the sale or lease of 
land.  The written offer and acceptance are usually known as the ‘missives’, and together 
these documents when executed and subscribed by the appropriate party in the written form 
                                               
3
 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights with observations upon the 
agreement or diversity between them and the laws of England (2 vols, Edinburgh, 1751-2), I, xi, 36 (also 
available in a reprint as vols 41-43 in the Stair Society series, edited with an introduction by William M Gordon).  
Note too Bankton’s observation on the English law, at I, xi (Observations on the Laws of England), 17. 
4
 Wilson v Fenton Bros (Glasgow) Ltd 1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 3.   
5
 Wilson v Fenton Bros (Glasgow) Ltd, per Sheriff-Substitute J C E Hay, at 5.  
6
 See Scottish Law Commission, Review of Contract Law. Report on Formation of Contract: Execution in 
Counterpart (Scot Law Com No 231, April 2013), paras 1.2-1.3.  
7
 [REFER SHAWN BAYERN’S CHAPTER.] 
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required by law meet those requirements as well as making clear that the parties have 
reached agreement.8   
 But the doctrines associated with offer and acceptance, painfully learned by generations 
of law students and applied with variable degrees of success in tackling tutorial and 
examination problems, do not appear to have been in the forefront of the Scots law on 
contract formation in general before 1800.  For all of the authoritative writers prior to that 
time, offer and acceptance was certainly a way in which contracts might be formed but 
equally certainly not the only one.9  The key requirement was, in the language of Stair (the 
greatest of these writers), the exercise of free will by parties to engage with each other ‘of 
purpose to oblige’.10  Engagement was to be distinguished from, first, desire, ‘a tendency or 
inclination of the will towards its object’,11 which was insufficient to create a right.  Similarly 
with resolution, ‘a determinate purpose to do that which is desired’12 but still no more than ‘an 
act of the will with itself’.13  ‘The only act of the will which is efficacious’, wrote Stair, ‘is that 
whereby the will conferreth or stateth a power of exaction in another, and thereby becomes 
engaged to that other to perform.’14  Engagement might be by one party alone, and was not 
necessarily a two-or-more-person process: hence the enforceability of a unilateral promise in 
Scots law, and also the possibility of third-party rights in a contract.15  A pactum or paction ‘is 
the consent of two or more parties, to some things to be performed by either of them; for it is 
not a consent in their opinions, but a consent in their wills, to oblige any of them; and it is 
much to be considered, whether the consent be given animo obligandi, to oblige or not’.16  It 
was this classic Will Theory understanding of the basis of conventional or voluntary 
obligations that made it relatively unproblematic, I would suggest, for the Scottish courts at 
the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to see an exchange by parties of 
duplicate documents, each subscribed only by the other, as simply one of the ways in which 
such obligations might come into existence.  
                                               
8
 See generally Douglas J Cusine and Robert Rennie, Missives (2
nd
 edition, Edinburgh: Butterworths/Law Society 
of Scotland, 1999); Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 2(2).  
9
 See Hector L MacQueen, ‘“It’s in the post!” Distance Contracting in Scotland 1681-1855’, in Essays in Property 
and Conveyancing in Honour of Robert Rennie, edited by Frankie McCarthy, James Chalmers and Stephen 
Bogle (Glasgow: Open Book Publishers, forthcoming). 
10
 James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (2
nd
 edn, Edinburgh: 1693), I, x, 13.  I 
have used the tercentenary edition (a reprint of the 2
nd
) published under the editorship of David M Walker by 
Edinburgh University Press in 1981.  
11
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 2. 
12
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 2. 
13
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 2. 
14
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 2. 
15
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 3-6. 
16
 Stair, Institutions, I, x, 6.   
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 Even in modern Scots contract law, as Professor McBryde has observed in the 
leading contemporary treatise on the subject, ‘[o]ffer and acceptance … should not be 
regarded as the necessary form of every contract.’17  The master concept of contract in 
Scots law to which McBryde elsewhere refers remains that of an ‘agreement between two or 
more parties … intended to establish, regulate, alter or extinguish a legal relationship and 
which gives rise to obligations and has other effects, even in respect of one party only’.18  
McBryde's chapter on offer and acceptance is preceded by one entitled ‘The Formation of a 
Contract’, and in this he explores requirements for enforceable agreements in general – 
notably for present purposes an intention to create legal relations, agreement on the 
‘essentials’ of the contract, and certainty of terms.19  Offer and acceptance is but one means 
of showing that the parties have reached agreement; there are other possibilities.  McBryde 
instances many everyday, undoubtedly contractual, situations such as the purchase of a 
ticket to travel on a local bus which do not fit readily into the offer-acceptance model.20  
Another example may be multi-party contracts to which the several parties agree at different 
times without necessarily going through a series of exchanges of offer and acceptance.21  
Back in the first part of the twentieth century the approach of the other major modern 
contract scholar, Professor William Murray Gloag of Glasgow, was similar: his first chapter 
was on the ‘Requisites of Contract’, looking at such matters as the meaning of obligation, 
contract as agreement, legal relations and patrimonial interest, and formalities in general, 
before turning in a second chapter to ‘Formation of Contract’, mainly (but not exclusively) 
taken up with the rules of offer and acceptance.22   
 In his chapter on formation, McBryde also discusses the situation touched upon by 
Shawn Bayern, that where the parties agree to put their contract into a single document or 
set of documents.23  While the general rule of Scots law is that writing is not required for the 
constitution of a contract save in the case of contracts for the creation, transfer, variation or 
extinction of a real right in land,24 nothing prevents parties from putting their contracts into 
writing if they so wish.25  The main focus of McBryde's discussion of this topic is not analysis 
                                               
17
 W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edn, Edinburgh: Scottish Universities Law Institute, 2007)  
para 6.05.   
18
 McBryde, Contract, para 1.03.   
19
 McBryde, Contract, chapter 5.   
20
 McBryde, Contract, paras 6.04-6.05.   
21
 The classic example in the books is Clarke v Earl of Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 (yacht race 
competitors bound by competition rules as contract to which all had at various points subscribed).  Other 
examples might be partnerships, unincorporated associations, the rules of tender competitions which bind all 
tenderers, and pension funds.  
22
 W M Gloag, The Law of Contract (2
nd
 edn, Edinburgh: W Green & Son Ltd, 1929), chs I and II.  
23
 McBryde, Contract, paras 5.41-5.44, and also para 5.79.  
24
 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(1).  See further McBryde, Contract, paras 5.71-5.78.  
25
 McBryde, Contract, para 5.79.  
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of the process in terms of offer and acceptance, but the relationship between the written 
agreement and the parties' preceding agreement.26  Implicit throughout is that the former is a 
contract, formed by virtue of its having been executed by the parties with the intention that it 
should be the basis of the legal relationship between them thenceforth, not by any process 
of offer and acceptance.  Gloag possibly put the matter more plainly when he stated: ‘Parties 
may, indeed, put their agreement into writing …’27  This situation is then now another 
example of a contract formed without offer and acceptance.  The parties' mutual consent is 
shown by the terms of the document itself and, where it has been signed by the parties, by 
those signatures.   
 This all said, there is no doubt that the doctrine of offer and acceptance continues to be 
a major element in the Scots law on formation of contract.  As already noted, McBryde and 
Gloag devote whole chapters to the topic, and other contract textbooks treat the subject at 
length.28  There is plenty of case law, ancient and modern, in which the doctrine has been 
carefully applied, sometimes with controversial results.29   An offer is a proposal by the 
offeror to the offeree, which will become a contract binding upon both parties upon the 
offeree’s unconditional acceptance.  Prior to such acceptance the offeror may withdraw the 
offer unless it contained a commitment not to do so.  Such a commitment is explained by the 
Scots law concept of a gratuitous promise binding without acceptance by the promisee.  The 
analysis of statements as offer or acceptance is generally conducted on an objective basis: 
‘[C]ommercial contracts cannot be arranged by what people think in their inmost minds.  
Commercial contracts are made according to what people say.’30  ‘The judicial task is not to 
discover the actual intentions of each party; it is to decide what each was reasonably entitled 
to conclude from the attitude of the other.’31  The result can be that parties who thought they 
had a contract turn out to have been wrong;32 or that a party can be held to a contract other 
than the one he thought he had entered;33 or that parties who were never actually 
                                               
26
 McBryde, Contract, paras 5.41-5.44.   
27
 Gloag, Contract, 161.  
28
 See e.g. Hector L MacQueen and Joe Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (3
rd
 edn, Haywards Heath: 
Bloomsbury Professional, 2012), paras 2.10-2.43. 
29
 See e.g. Cusine and Rennie, Missives, paras 3.18-3.32.  
30
 Muirhead & Turnbull v Dickson (1905) 7 F 686 per Lord President Dunedin, at 694.  
31
 Gloag, Contract, 6. 
32
 Mathieson Gee (Ayrshire) Ltd v Quigley 1952 SC (HL) 38 (parties litigated on basis of contract’s existence: 
House of Lords held there never was a contract between them). 
33
 Muirhead & Turnbull v Dickson (1905) 7 F 686 (contract one of sale rather than hire purchase). 
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simultaneously of one mind as to a particular transaction can be found to have nonetheless 
contracted.34 
 In general, offers, withdrawals thereof and acceptances have their effects upon 
communication to the other party, although communication too is determined objectively, 
with parties to be taken as having read that which in the ordinary course of business they ought 
to have read and being bound by the result.  Thus in Burnley v Alford in 1919 it was held that 
there was no contract when A had sent an offer to B at the latter’s home address, B had gone 
on holiday without leaving a forwarding address, A then sent a revocation of offer to B at his 
home address, and B, on returning from holiday, had not opened the revocation letter before 
posting an acceptance of offer to A.35 Had a set of appropriate facts arisen, the later nineteenth-
century Scottish courts would probably have analysed the case of cross-offers as the English 
court did in Tinn v Hoffmann,36 and in the fashion criticised by Shawn Bayern:37 i.e., no 
contract, because the subjective meeting of minds could not prevail over the objective fact that 
neither party knew of the other’s intention at the time of making their own communications, and 
so these could not be treated as responses to each other.38 
 The objective approach is also apparent in the more recent Outer House decision  of 
Carmarthen Developments Ltd v Pennington.39  This case involved a decision on whether a 
postal notice purifying suspensive conditions in a contract sent by law firm Dickson Minto 
took effect before the recipient solicitor (Mr Soeder), acting on behalf of his clients, sent a fax 
resiling from the contract.  Lord Hodge set out what he took to be the general approach 
(emphases supplied): 
What amounted to communication depends in the first place on the contract.  Where, 
as here, the contract did not exclude ordinary postal delivery … the delivery by a 
postman of the letters to the solicitors' office by pushing the envelope containing 
them through the letter box would have amounted to service of notice whether or not 
the lawyers promptly opened the envelope.  The defender's solicitors would then 
have had possession of the notices. It is the task of the recipients of mail to arrange 
                                               
34
 Thomson v James (1855) 18 D 1 (postal acceptance sent at same time as offeror’s postal revocation held to 
conclude contract at moment of posting).  
35
 Burnley v Alford 1919 2 SLT 123.  
36
 Tinn v Hoffmann & Co (1873) 29 LT 271. The case is cited without adverse comment in most Scottish contract 
texts: David M Walker, The Law of Contracts in Scotland (3
rd
 edn, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), para 7.43; 
McBryde, Contract, para 6.33; MacQueen & Thomson, Contract, para 2.18; The Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia (henceforth SME), vol 15, para 634.  It is not referred to, however, in Gloag, Contract.  
37
 [REFER SHAWN BAYERN’S CHAPTER.] 
38
 Whether this would have been true before Thomson v James in 1855 is more open to question: see 
MacQueen, ‘“It’s in the post!’’, forthcoming.  
39
 Carmarthen Developments Ltd v Pennington [2008] CSOH 139.   
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for its prompt handling and the sender of a notice cannot be prejudiced by internal 
delays in so doing …  Thus it appears to me that the contract envisaged that service 
would be effected as soon as the mail arrived in the solicitors' office.40 
The complicating factor in the case was that the notice was not delivered to the recipient's 
office by the postal service but was instead collected from the sorting office by Mr Soeder 
before his own office opened for business.  The notice was but one of a collection of letters 
addressed to his firm, gathered by the sorting office in a zipped bag for convenience; the 
whole process of collection was in accordance with the firm's usual practice.  It was also the 
Mr Soeder’s habit to do this as part of the school run with his daughters; pausing en route to 
the school to leave the mailbag at his office before setting his children down and returning to 
the office to open the letters in the bag.  On the day in question, however, the mailbag had 
been taken to the school before the solicitor's office and had therefore not been opened 
before the fax purporting to resile from the contracts took effect.  Lord Hodge held that in 
these circumstances the notice had been communicated before the resiling fax had taken 
effect, saying:  
In the present case the postman did not have an opportunity to deliver the mail to the 
offices of the defender's solicitors because it was the practice of Mr Soeder and his 
colleagues to uplift the mail from the Post Office at Jedburgh.  In my opinion that 
practice placed the defender's solicitors in a similar position before the mail bag 
arrived at their office to that which they would have been in had the envelope fallen 
through their letter box.  I do not consider that the fact that the Dickson Minto 
envelope was in a zipped mail bag with other letters prevented Mr Soeder from 
taking possession of the notices when he uplifted the mail on the Monday morning.  
He would have known that the mail bag contained letters.  …  The contracts in this 
case provided for service on the solicitors and parties would in all probability have 
expected postal service to be effected by a postman delivering the letters to the 
solicitors' offices.  There is no suggestion that parties addressed their minds to the 
question of when service would be effected if a partner uplifted the firm's mail from 
the Post Office.  I am satisfied that considerations both of sound business practice 
and also of the attribution of risk once the letters were in Mr Soeder's control point to 
service of the notices occurring when he uplifted the mail bag.  …  Common sense 
points towards this answer.  I recognise that different considerations might apply if at 
the weekend a member of staff of the defender's solicitors happened to be in the 
                                               
40
 Carmarthen, para 31. 
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Post Office and chose to pick up a mail bag and leave it in the firm's office for 
consideration on the next working day, but those are not the circumstances of this 
case.41 
It may well be that this approach illustrates how, as Shawn Bayern suggests, the objective 
analysis produces results mixing detailed factual investigation with more generalised 
standards of reasonable expectations and reasonable behaviour.42 
 A crucial exception to the requirement of communication, whether understood objectively 
or subjectively, is however the postal acceptance rule, by which in Scots law, as in the English 
and many other Common law legal systems, a posted acceptance is effective to conclude a 
contract from the moment of posting.43  The modern rationale for this rule is essentially that 
the offeror, having initiated the transaction and in doing so having use of the postal service in 
its contemplation, should bear the risks inherent in the period of time between the posting of 
the acceptance and its arrival with the offeror, while the offeree may rely on having a 
contract after doing all in its power to conclude one.   
 Gloag seemed to think it essential to the rule that the parties should have been 
previously negotiating by post, writing under the heading, ‘Contracts by Letter – Date of 
Completion’:  
In the ordinary case a contract is completed at the date when the acceptance is 
dispatched, by the channel of communication, if any, expressly agreed upon; if none, 
by the ordinary method of communication usual in cases of this particular class.  And 
in the absence of any indication of an intention to the contrary it will be assumed that 
an offerer contemplates a reply by post; if so, the contract is completed when the 
acceptance is posted.44   
But McBryde takes a different, more flexible, view of the matter, suggesting that the English 
approach of asking whether acceptance by post was within the parties’ contemplation is to 
be preferred.45  In Scotland, further, the offeree may also benefit from a presumption that a 
letter which has been posted has also been received.46  The English extension of the ‘postal 
rule’ to acceptance by telegram would probably have been followed in Scotland had the 
                                               
41
 Carmarthen, paras 32-33.  
42
 [REFERENCE SHAWN BAYERN’S PAPER.] 
43
 Gloag, Contract, 33-35; McBryde, Contract, paras 6.114-6.118; SME vol 15 para 629.  
44
 Gloag, Contract, 33.  The preceding paragraph is headed ‘Conditions in Offer by Letter’.  
45
 McBryde, Contract, para 6.118(3). 
46
 Chaplin v Caledonian Land Properties 1997 SLT 384.  See comments on this point in McBryde, Contract, para 
6.116, fn 345.  
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question ever arisen for decision.47  But doubt remained, and remains, about the English 
decision of Household Fire Insurance Co v Grant48 in which it was held that even if a posted 
acceptance never reaches the intended party a contract will be concluded despite the 
offeror's ignorance of its obligations; there are several judicial dicta against it from the mid-
nineteenth century down to the present.49  An acceptance posted within a time limit set by an 
offer but arriving with the offeror only after the limit's expiry nonetheless concludes a contract 
between the parties.50  There is however room for doubt as to whether there is a contract 
when an offeree who has posted an acceptance succeeds in communicating a withdrawal of 
that acceptance to the offeror that arrives with the latter before or at the same time as the 
acceptance.  That is a possible interpretation of the 1830 case of Countess of Dunmore v 
Alexander,51 in which a servant who had indicated willingness to enter employment by the 
Countess received simultaneously from her two letters, the one sent first confirming the 
Countess’ wish to employ the servant, the other stating a change of mind.  The court’s 
decision that there was no contract is sometimes seen as resulting from a view that a postal 
acceptance can be cancelled by an over-taking retraction.  It can however be analysed in 
other ways, for example, as the withdrawal of an offer rather than an acceptance.52   
1.2 Law Reform: Scotland in Europe  
This then is the basic state of the law which the Scottish Law Commission first reviewed in 
the 1970s, looked at again in the early 1990s, and has considered once more in a 
Discussion Paper published in 2012.53  The basis upon which the reviews have been carried 
out has evolved over time.  The 1970s exercise was perhaps the ultimate fruit of the efforts 
which had gone initially into the preparation of a Contract Code for the whole of the United 
Kingdom as the country prepared for membership of what was then known as the European 
Community.54  In the early 1990s, the Commission was building upon the apparent success 
                                               
47
 See the English decision in Bruner v Moore [1904] 1 Ch 220, seemingly accepted by Gloag, Contract, 33 note 
7. The grant of a public monopoly of the telegram service to the Post Office in 1869 (see Tom Standage, The 
Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century's Online Pioneers 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998), 161-2; Duncan Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post: The Authorized 
History of the Royal Mail (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 175-183) probably played a significant part in this 
development of the law.  
48
 (1878-79) LR 4 Ex D 216 (CA).   
49
 See McBryde, Contract, para 6.115, for the doubting authorities, and add Sloans Dairies v Glasgow Corp 1977 
SC 223 (IH) per Lord Dunpark at 239.  
50
 Jacobsen, Sons & Co v Underwood & Son Ltd (1894) 21 R 654.  
51
 Countess of Dunmore v Alexander (1830) 9 S 190. 
52
 McBryde, Contract, para 6.53.  See further MacQueen ‘“It’s in the post!’’, forthcoming.  
53
 See Consultative Memorandum No 36 on Constitution and Proof of Voluntary Obligations: Formation of 
Contract (1977); Report on Formation of Contract: Scottish Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (Scot Law Com No 144, 1993); Review of Contract Law: Discussion Paper No 
154 on Formation of Contract (March 2012, henceforth DP No 154). 
54
 On the abortive Contract Code project see Hector L MacQueen, ‘Glory with Gloag or the Stake with Stair? T B 
Smith and the Scots Law of Contract’, in A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of 
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of the (Vienna) Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) in establishing 
an internationally acceptable regime on, inter alia, formation of contract.  The 2012 exercise 
was similar in spirit in that it examined Scots law in the light of international – mostly, 
European – standards which themselves represent evolutions from the CISG: the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), the (Lando) Principles of European 
Contract Law (PECL) and, most recently, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR): 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, prepared for the European 
Commission by a mainly academic group of lawyers from all over the European Union and 
published in 2009.55  The European Commission’s grander ideas of a common contract law 
for the whole of the European Union dwindled to a proposal for an ‘optional instrument’ 
Common European Sales Law (CESL) confined to cross-border distance and online 
transactions before even that was abandoned in December 2014.56  But the CESL still 
included detailed rules on contract formation developed from those in the earlier instruments.  
Clearly these rules could still be used for any further European Union regime that may be 
proposed in future. In the meantime, however, in Scotland they can form the basis for a 
‘health check’ for the general law of contract.  
 
1.2.1 The offer and acceptance model and contract as agreement  
In relation to contract formation and the rules of offer and acceptance, the international and 
European documents show a significant development from the CISG on.  Article 23 of the 
CISG simply defines the moment of conclusion of a contract as being when an acceptance 
of an offer became effective, i.e. in general, when it 'reaches' the offeror, is the nearest that 
that text comes to defining a contract.  While it does not expressly preclude the possibility 
that a contract may be concluded in other ways, the rule as stated can give the impression 
that offer and acceptance is a necessary condition for such conclusion, especially when 
most of its other specific rules are indeed about offer and acceptance.  But whatever its 
suitability for the international commercial sales that are the subject matter for the CISG, that 
this is inappropriate as the only rule of contract formation emerges from the development of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Scots Law , edited by Elspeth Reid and David L Carey Miller (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 138-
72 at 157-63.  
55
 For the relationship between the CISG and the other instruments mentioned, see Hector L MacQueen, 
‘Europeanisation of Contract Law and the Proposed Common European Sales Law’, in Commercial Contract 
Law: Transatlantic Perspectives, edited by Larry A DiMatteo, Qi Zhou, Séverine Saintier and Keith Rowley (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 529-558, 530-532. 
56
 Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, COM(2011) 635 final, available at 
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0159&format=XML&language=EN.  
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the CISG text by the PICC, which makes clear that a contract may also be concluded by 
conduct of the parties showing that they have reached agreement.57  The PICC also further 
elaborates a further rule that parties may agree that their agreement is not to become 
effective as a legally binding contract until it has been reduced to a particular form or they 
have reached agreement on a particular matter.58  It also provides that there may be a 
contract even although the parties are not fully agreed on all terms.59   
 The DCFR contains no statement like that of Article 23 of the CISG, although, as we 
will see in some detail below, it does have an elaborate structure of rules of offer and 
acceptance otherwise very similar to those in the CISG.  For the DCFR the governing 
principle of contract formation is the existence of a sufficiently certain agreement between 
parties with an intention for it to have legal effect,60 while it also states that there may be a 
contract even although the negotiations between the parties cannot be analysed in terms of 
offer and acceptance.61  The proposed CESL states that agreement is reached by 
acceptance of an offer, which may be either explicit or by other statements or conduct 
indicating intention.62  It does not seem that this is meant to preclude the possibility of 
reaching agreement by methods other than offer and acceptance, although the matter could 
usefully be clarified in the text by the European Commission before the proposal becomes 
law.   
 The DCFR lays down that an agreement is sufficient if (a) the terms of the contract have 
been sufficiently defined by the parties for the contract to be given effect; or (b) the terms of 
the contract, or the rights and obligations of the parties under it, can be otherwise sufficiently 
determined for the contract to be given effect.63  The proposed CESL, however, simply said 
that agreement is sufficient if the terms agreed, supplemented if necessary by the rules of 
the CESL itself, have sufficient content and certainty to be given effect as a contract.64  Like 
the PICC both texts express a rule that, if one of the parties refuses to conclude a contract 
until the parties have agreed on some specific matter, there is no contract unless agreement 
on that matter has been reached.65  But the DCFR principle of party autonomy means that 
                                               
57
 PICC art 2.1.1.  
58
 PICC art 2.1.13. 
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 PICC art 2.1.14. 
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 DCFR II.-4:101.  
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 DCFR II.-4:211. 
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parties are also free to agree that there will be no contract between them until it has been 
reduced to writing and, if they so wish, signed in some form or other. 
 The provisional view of the Scottish Law Commission is that if there were to be a 
general legislative statement of the law on formation of contract it would be necessary to go 
further than the simple statement in the CISG that a contract is formed by offer and 
acceptance, and that the other matters referred to in the DCFR and the PICC would also 
have to be brought in.66  To that extent, at least, the Commission would accept Shawn 
Bayern’s argument that offer and acceptance should not be seen as the only mode of 
contract formation.67  The rules in the DCFR and the other texts are consistent with present 
Scots law and, moreover, of considerable practical importance.  A statutory restatement of 
the Scots law of contract formation should therefore include similar rules.  The most 
appropriate model to adopt for these purposes from those surveyed would, it is suggested, 
be that provided by the Expert Group revision of the DCFR prior to the CESL proposal, 
which appears to cover all the points in a succinct and intellectually lucid fashion:   
(1) A contract is concluded if: 
(a) the parties reach an agreement; 
(b) they intend the agreement to have legal effect; and 
(c) the agreement, supplemented if necessary by rules of law, has sufficient 
content and certainty to be given legal effect. 
 
(2) Agreement may be reached by acceptance of an offer or by other statements or 
conduct. 
 
(3) The intention of the parties that the agreement will have legal effect is to be 
determined from their statements and conduct interpreted in accordance with the 
rules on interpretation in Article 12. 
 
(4) If one of the parties makes agreement on some specific matter a requirement for 
the conclusion of a contract, there is no contract unless agreement on that matter 
has been reached.68 
 
It might, however, be useful also to make specific reference, as in the PICC,69 to the situation 
where one or more of the parties wishes there to be no contract until the agreement is 
recorded in a particular form, although this is probably covered by the rule that the parties 
must intend their agreement to have legal effect before it can have contractual force. 
                                               
66
 DP No 154, paras 2.9, 2.12. 
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 [REFERENCE SHAWN BAYERN’S ARTICLE.] 
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 Commission Expert Group on European Contract Law, Feasibility Study for a Future Instrument in European 
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Expert Group’s task, see DP No 154, para 1.3.  
69
 PICC art 2.1.13; and see Stefan Vogenauer and Jan Kleinheisterkamp (eds), Commentary on the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 291.  
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 One clear advantage of this approach is that it leaves no doubt that a deliberate 
exchange of identical documents each signed by one of the parties is, as an agreement, a 
contract, just like a mutual document signed by all the parties.  On this basis, it was possible 
for the Scottish Law Commission to go forward and make a Report in 2013 on the vexed 
topic of execution in counterpart, and for an implementing Bill to be put before the Scottish 
Parliament in May 2014, without it being seen as an anglicisation of Scots law.70  As already 
noted, there is nothing in the principles of Scots law to prevent a contract being created in 
this way.71  It was necessary to ensure that the formal requirements with regard to obligatory 
writing are complied with, and the opportunity was also taken to modernize the rules on 
delivery to recognize electronic transmission as a potential method of meeting that 
requirement;72 but underpinning it all is the clear view that parties’ exchange of identical 
copies of a contract so that each ends up with a copy signed by the other party is a way of 
showing agreement with intention to be bound as between the respective parties to that 
exchange.  
 All this said, however, offer and acceptance will continue to be a key method of 
making contracts: parties who want to be sure they have a contract are thereby provided 
with a mechanism by which it can be achieved without too much formality.  It is also 
important to remember that in modern business practice, parties rarely meet in person to 
negotiate, never mind complete, their contracts.  When a court is considering the existence 
or not of a contract between parties who were physically remote from each other at the time 
of their negotiations, offer and acceptance analysis remains a useful analytical tool.  Current 
European developments do not suggest any perception that offer and acceptance analysis 
has had its day in the sun.  There are detailed rules on the subject in the recent international 
instruments as there have long been in domestic laws, and these provide a platform for 
recent detailed reform proposals from the Scottish Law Commission.  One option which the 
Commission puts forward is a statutory restatement (with amendments to the present law 
where appropriate) of the law on formation; and if this comes to pass, most of it will be taken 
up, one imagines, with rules on offer and acceptance.73 
1.2.2 Communication: postal and other acceptances  
                                               
70
 Scot Law Com No 231, 2013; Legal Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Bill 2014 (for which see 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/76414.aspx).   
71
 See text accompanying notes 1-17.  The Bill was passed in February 2015. 
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 See sections 1, 4 of the Bill.   
73
 DP No 154, para 1.28.  
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A key question in offer and acceptance, now as in the past, is that of communication: the 
extent to which it is necessary between the parties to a formational exchange, and what will 
constitute communication for these purposes.  Just as in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the development of postal and then telegraphic and telephonic communications 
raised critical questions about these matters for the law to answer,74 so in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries we have had successively to consider the telex,75 the fax, email, 
connecting through websites, and SMS or text messaging or simple downloading and 
streaming as means by which distant parties seek to contract with each other.  Not all of 
these devices have as yet received definitive characterisations from the courts; and one task 
of law reform is surely to provide such answers so that negotiating parties can know where 
they stand without the potential additional expense involved in resorting to litigation for such 
clarification as the judges may be able to give.  
 Under the CISG rules on contract formation (drawn up of course before the digital 
revolution of the late twentieth century), it is important to know whether a communication 
from one party has 'reached' the other party, be it an offer, an acceptance, or a withdrawal or 
revocation of either of the former two.  This was because until such reaching took place, in 
general, no such communication had legal effect.  It was accordingly necessary to define 
what would constitute reaching for these purposes: ‘when it is made orally to [the addressee] 
or delivered by any other means to him personally, to his place of business or mailing 
address or, if he does not have a place of business or mailing address, to his habitual 
residence.’76  The PICC, the DCFR and the proposed CESL adopt and, in the case of the 
latter two, elaborate the concept of 'reaching' in respect of what they call 'notices', a further 
concept which covers a variety of communications including, but not limited to, offers, 
acceptances and their withdrawal or revocation.77  The approach in the texts is an objective 
one: 'reaching' does not necessarily involve the intended recipient's actual knowledge, either 
that there has been a communication from the sender or, even more so, what the contents of 
that communication may be.78   
 In contrast to the CISG and the PICC, however, the DCFR makes no express mention 
of oral notices, although clearly the face-to-face or telephonic communication is covered by 
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 On the development of the postal system in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Scotland, see A R 
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its provisions.  In general in such situations the recipient will have simultaneous knowledge 
both of the fact of communication and of the content of the communication.  But any legal 
effect that other, non-oral forms of communication have applies from delivery to the 
recipient's residence or place of business, as the case may be.  Thus, for example, a posted 
letter which has been delivered to its addressee's office but not yet opened will probably be 
regarded as having reached its recipient, at least from the point at which it would be 
reasonable for it to have been opened.  The DCFR commentary says that this covers ‘for 
example, leaving a message in a place which the addressee is known to check regularly’.79  
Whether this would extend to having notified the addressee of a registered or couriered letter 
awaiting collection from the local depot of the post office or courier is, however, not clear.80   
What then of the postal acceptance?  The basic rule in the CISG (and, following it, 
the PICC) – that an acceptance concludes a contract when it reaches the offeror, not when it 
is posted81 – is not quite emulated in the DCFR, which confines its otherwise similar rule to 
the case where the acceptance is ‘dispatched’.82  This suggests that the principle set out is 
not necessarily applicable to, for example, situations where the parties are dealing face-to-
face or on the telephone.83  The proposed CESL replaces ‘dispatched’ with the simpler 
‘sent’,84 but its formulation seems to have the same implication of non-application except 
between parties operating from different places.  However the words are to be interpreted, it 
is clear that the instruments do not have any special rule whereby postal acceptances take 
effect on posting.  
 Unlike their predecessors, the DCFR (followed in this by the proposed CESL) add a 
considerable amount to all this in dealing specifically with the legal effect of electronic 
communications.  The objective concept of 'reaching' the recipient continues to apply but it is 
given further definition.  Under the DCFR and the proposed CESL an electronically 
transmitted notice 'reaches' its addressee when it becomes accessible to that party.85  Thus 
a fax received (but not necessarily printed out, if, for example, the machine has run out of 
paper) on the addressee's fax machine, or a voice mail recorded on the addressee's 
telephone message system can be taken as having 'reached' the addressee by becoming 
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 DCFR, vol 1, p 113.  
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'accessible' to that party even if not actually accessed.86  Thus, in a context where the 
concept of 'business hours' is relevant, a communication that reaches the addressee's 
system outside those hours will become accessible for the purposes of the DCFR and the 
proposed CESL rules when the next period of business hours opens.87   
 By emphasising accessibility to the addressee as the test of legal effectiveness in this 
way, the DCFR and the proposed CESL avoid some of the technical difficulties that may 
arise from the nature of the infrastructure through which an online communication makes its 
way from sender to addressee, helpfully described as follows by Eliza Mik: 
Most online communications … rely on the client-server architecture.  In the case of 
email, there are at least two originating devices (the sender's mail-client and the 
outgoing mail-server) and two terminating devices (the addressee's incoming mail-
server and the mail-client).  Is it the mail-client or the mail-server that should be taken 
into account? … [T]here may be substantial delays between the moment a message 
arrives at the server and the moment it is transferred to the client … [O]nline 
communications are characterized by a number of novel risks.  The Internet is not 
like the post or the telephone.  Despite its ubiquity, it does not (yet) have the 
uniformity of one global system.  The Internet is heterogeneous – each of its 
component networks retains some individual characteristics.  Routing from one 
network to another may involve a conversion between the 'idiosyncrasies of the two 
original networks' and require the trans-coding, translation or reformatting of 
messages.  Each of these operations aims to adapt the message to the requirements 
of the next step in the transmission.  Such conversions are, however, not always 
successful.  As a result, there are many reasons an email may not be delivered or be 
delivered in unreadable form.88 
                                               
86
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 It has been suggested that the default rule as to when an email communication is 
received by its addressee should be arrival on the server that manages that party's email.89  
This is in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce,90 whose Article 15(2) 
provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the time of 
receipt of a data message is determined as follows: 
a) if the addressee has designated an information system for the purpose of 
receiving data messages, receipt occurs: 
(i) at the time when the data message enters the designated 
information system; or 
(ii) if the data message is sent to an information system of the 
addressee that is not the designated information system, at the time 
when the data message is retrieved by the addressee; 
(b) if the addressee has not designated an information system, receipt occurs 
when the data message enters an information system of the addressee. 
Arrival at the recipient's server will generally make the communication accessible to the 
addressee and so satisfy the DCFR test, even if the addressee does not in fact access it.  
The objective requirement of 'accessibility' probably also means that the email which the 
addressee cannot access as a result of the operation of the network, or firewalls, or anti-
virus filters, is an effective notice none the less; likewise if the communication fails because 
a recipient's inbox is full or is consigned by security systems to a 'suspected spam' folder.  In 
all these cases the email is an effective notice because the obstacles to accessing the email 
are within the addressee's control: the addressee has selected the system by which it 
wishes to receive communications of the type in question.  The position may be different if 
the sender is alerted by the system to the fate that has befallen its attempted 
communication, in which case the sender should know that the communication has failed 
and make another attempt.91  Automatic 'out of office' or 'vacation' messages set up by an 
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absent addressee may also postpone the effectiveness of an email notice but much might 
depend on the specificity and reliability of the absentee's message.   
 The generally objective approach of Scots law to when a communication is made is 
consistent with the approach found in the international texts forming the basis for the 
Scottish Law Commission review, and no change to that basic position is proposed.  It would 
be for consideration whether in any statutory restatement the rule should be stated in terms 
of 'notices', as in the PICC, the DCFR and the proposed CESL, or whether it would be 
preferable to follow the original CISG model and express the rule in terms of offers, 
acceptances and other indications of intention such as revocation of an offer.  Most 
respondents agreed that any statutory restatement of the law on formation of contract should 
provide that, in general, any relevant statement of a party's intention should have effect only 
when its intended addressee should have become aware that it had been made. 
 Scots law generally has a flexible approach as to when a communication of one 
party's intention should have become known to its addressee, and there are no rules 
specifying, for example, delivery to the addressee or the latter's place of business or habitual 
residence as in the international texts.  The words of Lord Wilberforce in one of the leading 
modern English cases were cited and applied in the Carmarthen case: ‘No universal rule can 
cover all such cases: they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by 
sound business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie.’92  
While this is attractive in the context of what may often be complex fact situations, it may be 
open to the criticism that only by going to court will it be possible to get an answer to the 
question in any given case.  Nor have the Scottish courts so far had any opportunity to 
consider the question of when an electronic communication of a party's intention takes 
effect.  The international texts, here including the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce, seem to favour a broadly similar default rule, namely that the communication 
takes effect when it becomes accessible to its intended addressee, which is generally taken 
to be when the message enters the addressee's communications system and becomes 
accessible to that person.93  This appears to be a workable rule and one which fairly 
apportions the risks of mis- or non-communication between the parties involved.   
The Scottish Law Commission thinks that there should be a single general rule or 
principle on when acceptances become effective, whether between parties who are face-to-
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face or who are distant from each other.94  As between the texts of the international 
instruments, it feels that the CISG/PICC version is to be preferred because it clearly covers 
all situations, including those where distant parties are nonetheless in virtually instantaneous 
communication with each other, such as on the telephone, and better reflects the general 
position at present in Scots law.  The Commission was informed that in the light of the 
present state of the law on postal acceptances it is conventional for formal offers of a 
contract to stipulate that to be effective acceptances must reach the offeror.95  Thus it is no 
longer the case that commercial usage and practice favour the postal acceptance rule, 
whatever the position may have been in the nineteenth century.  The courts will give effect to 
such eliminations of the postal rule where they are made, no doubt recognising important 
underlying commercial realities.96    
The Scottish Law Commission therefore provisionally concludes that, with one 
exception to be discussed further below, there is now no need to provide for a postal 
exception to the general rule that an acceptance must reach the offeror to conclude a 
contract.97  The Commission has taken the view since 1977 that in general both offers and 
acceptances should be effective only when they have reached the other party.98  Such a 
position would better accord with the reasonable expectations of ordinary people and 
indeed, the commercial community, in Scotland.  All respondents to the Discussion Paper 
agreed that the general rule on when an acceptance becomes effective and concludes a 
contract should be when the indication of assent reaches the offeror.  The Commission’s 
proposal will thus bring the law into line with standard business practice.   
At the same time the rule would be one from which parties can in turn step out.  This 
may be particularly important for a supplier in e-commerce faced with the possibility of 
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receiving more orders electronically than it can fulfil from its stock.  Thus Amazon.co.uk uses 
the following clause on its website: 
Your order is an offer to Amazon to buy the product(s) in your order. When you place 
an order to purchase a product from Amazon, we will send you an e-mail confirming 
receipt of your order and containing the details of your order (the ‘Order Confirmation 
E-mail’). The Order Confirmation E-mail is acknowledgement that we have received 
your order, and does not confirm acceptance of your offer to buy the product(s) 
ordered. We only accept your offer, and conclude the contract of sale for a product 
ordered by you, when we dispatch the product to you and send e-mail confirmation to 
you that we've dispatched the product to you (the ‘Dispatch Confirmation E-mail’).99 
In effect Amazon regards dispatch of the ordered goods and sending a confirmation email to 
the customer as acceptance.  This would be effective under the Commission scheme.  
There is finally perhaps a need in this scheme for an elaboration of when an 
electronically communicated offer or acceptance ‘reaches’ its addressee, along the objective 
lines of ‘accessibility’ (which may however not be inconsistent with the present general 
approach in Scotland).  Consultation responses to the Scottish Law Commission were 
generally favourable to this approach as well. 
1.2.3 Protection against revocation of offers? 
Having established this position, the Commission also recognised that an important function 
performed by the postal acceptance rule is the protection of the offeree from revocation by 
the offeror once the acceptance is posted.  It is established in the present Scots law that 
offers can be terminated without liability unless either declared to be irrevocable in some 
way (a firm offer) or effectively accepted by the offeree.100  Since the offeror's revocation can 
only take effect upon arrival at the offeree's place, any acceptance posted before that event 
renders the revocation of the offer ineffective, because a contract already exists from which 
the offeror cannot unilaterally withdraw.101  It would be unsatisfactory if, as a result of the 
removal of the postal rule, such cases became disputes about which of the two 
communications had been first to reach its intended recipient and become effective.  The 
Commission has therefore also proposed a rule dealing with this issue, namely, that an offer 
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may not be revoked once the offeree has sent an acceptance, on the basis that a party 
which has done all it can to effect an acceptance should thereafter be free from concern 
about subsequently arriving revocations.102   
 This again follows the approach found in the international instruments.  The basic 
rule in these instruments is that an offer may be revoked at any time until the completion of 
acceptance by the offeree unless the offeror has declared it to be irrevocable.103  It is, 
however, another question whether an offeree can be protected other than by finding that 
there is a contract as a result of posting it.  The CISG view, accepted in the RFC and further 
affirmed by the PICC, the DCFR and the proposed CESL, is that the offeree who has done 
everything reasonably possible to effect an acceptance should be protected from the 
offeror's subsequently arriving revocation, but that it is not necessary to do so by holding that 
a contract is thereby concluded.  Instead, as Lord Fullerton actually suggested for Scotland 
in Higgins v Dunlop in 1847,104 the rule is that the offeror’s revocation is ineffective from the 
moment the acceptance is posted.  Whether or not there is then a contract depends upon 
the arrival of the acceptance at the offeror’s place.105 
Such a rule would clearly be the right one where the parties are in instantaneous or 
near-instantaneous communication with each other, and there seem to be no strong reasons 
for departing from it where the parties are distant and for some reason choosing the postal 
system rather than using the speedier forms of communication available to them.  
Consultees, however, were somewhat hesitant about a rule which appeared to be the postal 
acceptance rule in a different guise, with some thinking that it might be regularly departed 
from by offerors wishing to protect their power to revoke until the other party’s acceptance 
was actually received, as well as questioning whether offerees should be protected in this 
way.  How the Commission will proceed on this point remains to be seen. 
1.2.4 When is an offer irrevocable? 
CISG and PICC say that an offer cannot be revoked ‘if it indicates, whether by stating a fixed 
time for acceptance or otherwise [emphasis supplied], that it is irrevocable’.106  The RFC 
explained that the effect of the CISG formulation was to make the question of whether or not 
an offer was irrevocable a question of construction of its terms, ‘bearing in mind that the 
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stating of a fixed time within which an offer is open for acceptance will normally indicate 
irrevocability’.107  This, it was said, was ‘essentially the same as the existing law of Scotland’, 
and ‘a sensible rule’.108  The DCFR (which has been followed in this regard by the proposed 
CESL) may put forward a slightly different, more limited, rule: an offer may indicate that it is 
irrevocable, or state a fixed time for its acceptance, in which case it is irrevocable.109  It is, 
however, still a question of construction ultimately whether or not an offer has indicated its 
irrevocability, or stated a fixed time for its acceptance.   
 The DCFR/proposed CESL rule would therefore not necessarily change the outcome 
of the two Scottish cases described in the RFC and said there to be consistent with the 
CISG approach.110  In the first of these, it was held that an offer ‘made on condition of 
acceptance within three days’ was one which could not be accepted after three days rather 
than one which was irrevocable within the same period.111  Likewise in the second case an 
offer in which it was stated that the contract must be concluded by a particular date and time 
was held not to be irrevocable.112  In 2012, the Scottish Law Commission thought that, 
subject always to whether an offer on its proper construction meets the requirements of 
irrevocability, the DCFR/proposed CESL formulation of the rule is more direct than that in the 
CISG and so more readily understood by the reader, and therefore suggested that, if there is 
to be a statutory restatement of the law of formation of contract, on this topic the 
DCFR/proposed CESL rule provides the better model to be followed.113   
1.2.5 Withdrawal of irrevocable offer? 
Under the CISG and the PICC 'withdrawal' of an offer is to be distinguished from its 
'revocation'.  The difference is that an offer is 'withdrawn' if it has not yet taken effect as an 
offer (i.e. reached the offeree), but has to be 'revoked' if it has taken effect by virtue of 
having reached the offeree.114  The DCFR and the proposed CESL draw the same distinction 
through their provisions on 'notices'.115  While, unlike the CISG and the PICC, the DCFR and 
the proposed CESL do not mention the possibility of a notice being stated to be irrevocable, 
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it would follow from the overall system that an irrevocability provision in an offer would not 
take effect until it reached the addressee.  Thus such an offer could be withdrawn up to and 
including that point in time.   
Scots law has not addressed this question directly but it would probably reach the 
same answer.  Even if, as a promise within an offer,116 the declaration of irrevocability may 
not require objective communication to the offeree to be effective, it is thought that the courts 
would find not bound the offeror who communicated withdrawal before or at the same time 
as the declaration.117  In the RFC it was thought that the solutions provided by the CISG 
were satisfactory as well as in line with existing Scots law.118  The subsequent minimal 
development of the CISG text by the PICC, the DCFR and the proposed CESL suggests that 
the first of these conclusions continues to hold good.  The Scottish Law Commission 
therefore proposed that in any statutory restatement of the law on formation of contract, 
there should be a rule that an offer, even if it is stated to be irrevocable, may be withdrawn if 
the withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.119  This seemed 
to command support from consultees. 
1.2.6 Revoking or withdrawing acceptances?  
A final point is that, on one possible view of Countess of Dunmore v Alexander, acceptances 
once posted can in any event be revoked, so long as the revocation reaches the offeror 
before or at the same time as the acceptance.120  While this result seems to go against the 
logic of the postal acceptance rule, it may confirm that the underlying policy of Scots law in 
this area is the protection of the offeree's interests ahead of those of the offeror; and 
certainly in the suggested scenario it is hard to see that the offeror suffers any prejudice in 
the result.  The postal acceptance rule took shape in a world where the relatively newly 
developed postal system provided the only means of communication between distant 
parties.  The position in the twenty-first century is (and indeed was for much of the twentieth) 
completely different, with a wide range of alternative means of communication available to 
the parties.  While it remains common to use posted letters in business practice, copies of 
such documents will often first be faxed to their intended recipient or sent as attachments to 
emails.  The documents themselves may really be formal confirmations of earlier telephone 
conversations and less formal email exchanges.  Letters can be readily overtaken by faster 
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means of communication.  In this context, the idea that one or other of distant negotiating 
parties needs protection from the risks inherent in the gap of time between the sending and 
receiving of a letter by means of a special rule of law is less persuasive than may have 
seemed to be the case in the mid-nineteenth century and before.  If for example, Assumpta 
merely posts an acceptance to offeror Orlando, without using one of the many available 
means of letting him know that the communication is on its way, the latter might seem to 
have the stronger case for protection from delay in the mail system or actual loss in the post.  
This, it can be argued, would better accord with the ordinary expectations of those parties 
(particularly commercial entities) who engage in contracts, looking to the law to provide a 
reasonable and equitable allocation of risk.   
1.3 Conclusions   
This paper has made two main points.  The first of these is that in Scots law, and also under 
the international soft law instruments which have flowed from the CISG, it is reasonably clear 
that in principle contract arises from the objectively determined agreement of the parties and 
that it is not necessary to force every negotiation into the offer-acceptance model in order to 
determine whether or not a contract exists.  The second is that none the less the offer and 
acceptance analysis is a means of determining whether or not a contract exists which is at 
its most useful when the parties are not dealing in each other’s presence, particularly where 
they are exchanging written communications which are not picked up by the other side as 
soon as they are sent.  It is not the only way for such remote parties to contract, as can be 
seen from the example of execution in counterpart; but it provides a path which parties 
wishing to contract can follow if they so choose, and which courts can deploy efficiently in 
the event of a dispute as to whether or not a series of communications has given rise to a 
contract.  
 If it is not necessary to deploy the offer-acceptance analysis to every potential 
contract, then we do not need to ask ourselves questions about, for example, the formal 
written contract signed by all parties together at a ‘signing ceremony’.  It is quite clear at the 
end of the process that there is a contract, and it is superfluous to debate whether each 
successive signatory was at the time of signing making an offer to all the other signatories 
and/or accepting the offer or offers made by preceding signatories.  Likewise in the case of 
execution in counterpart.  There might be more interesting issues if the signing ceremony or 
the counterpart execution process broke down half-way through, with some party or parties 
refusing to sign after others had executed the document.  But whether offer and acceptance 
analysis will provide very useful answers in this context is doubtful.  If there has been any 
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offer or acceptance, it has surely been only between the parties who have already signed; 
from the viewpoint of completing the contract properly, surely in general all must be bound or 
none.121  A Scots lawyer might wonder whether the concept of the binding unilateral promise 
could have relevance for the parties who have already signed, by committing them in some 
way to adhere to the contract for at least a reasonable time (which might not be very long in 
the circumstances), or in barring (estopping) them from withdrawing altogether or seeking to 
renegotiate for their own particular interests; but in practical terms any such promise or bar 
would certainly not prevent negotiations with or on behalf of the party or parties declining to 
sign in order to overcome whatever the obstacle to completion might be.   
 From the point of view of law reform, the realisation that offer and acceptance is not 
necessary for contract cannot mean that the doctrines associated with the analysis should 
be simply swept away.  It is clear that they continue to serve useful purposes, meaning that 
the law reform question is rather whether or not they could be made more useful in 
contemporary conditions, notably with regard to electronic communications.  Also calling out 
for reform is the postal acceptance rule, which seems to have taken shape against the 
background of nineteenth-century business customs and expectations very different from 
those of today (as shown by its common exclusion by those aware of its existence).  While 
the rule is a default one, meaning that parties can change it, it would seem better to have a 
default rule consistent with general expectations so that those unaware of it specifically are 
not taken by unpleasant surprise when it suddenly bites.  But the new rule should be a 
default one too, so that parties such as Amazon working in new ways of doing business, can 
shape their transactions to meet their needs as well as possible. 
 A final law reform thought is that it is possible to solve other problems of contract 
formation without necessarily having to work within the straitjacket of offer and acceptance.  
To some extent the international soft law instruments and, following them, the proposed 
CESL have accordingly been able to develop a different approach to the problem touched 
upon by Shawn Bayern,122 that of the ‘battle of the forms’, where the offer-acceptance 
analysis of parties’ exchange of incompatible standard terms prior to an arrangement 
(usually) for the supply of goods or services between them should lead to the probably 
inappropriate conclusion of either no contract or contract on the terms of the last party to 
send in its terms because the other party’s subsequent performance is taken as acceptance 
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by conduct.123  The problem arises as a result of a business context in which ordinarily it 
would be inefficient to spend time negotiating the terms of the contract in question.  Although 
in the United Kingdom the courts have on the whole favoured using the offer-acceptance 
analysis in such cases on the grounds of greater certainty than would be provided by some 
deeper search for what the parties may be taken objectively to have agreed, the certainty 
seems to be more for the courts themselves than the parties; the judges are spared the need 
to try and work out a solution beyond the respective sets of terms over which the parties 
failed to negotiate.  The outcomes often seem random, dependent on factors which really 
have nothing to do with the parties’ actual agreement, or lack of it.  So the Scottish Law 
Commission put out for consultation the view that an approach less dominated by offer and 
acceptance might be preferable.124  While consultation responses were by no means 
uniformly hostile to this idea, there was also undoubted concern about setting judges loose 
to impose their view of commercially sensible solutions to the difficulties of combatants in the 
battle of the forms.  So the reign of offer and acceptance as perhaps the default approach to 
difficult questions of contract formation is by no means over yet in Scotland.  But the days of 
its dominance may be numbered.  
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